Franchisor Liability in ADA Construction Compliance by Frisch, Matthew Edward
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
5-1-2013
Franchisor Liability in ADA Construction
Compliance
Matthew Edward Frisch
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Frisch, Matthew Edward, "Franchisor Liability in ADA Construction Compliance" (2013). Law School Student Scholarship. 224.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/224
 1 
Franchisor Liability in ADA Construction Compliance 
Written by Matthew Frisch
1
 
 
I. Introduction 
 After a long day of travel, it is a relief to open up the door to a hotel room and finally take 
refuge in a comfortable room.  While many people take these brief moments for granted, some 
Americans do not always open a door to an accommodating room.  People with physical 
disabilities may face substantial frustration when arriving at some nationally prominent hotels, 
which confirmed the availability of a handicap-accessible room on the phone but fail to offer 
such accommodation when the patron is tired and ready for sleep.
2
   
This is a harsh reality for citizens such as the plaintiffs in Equal Rights Center v. Hilton 
Hotels Corp.
3
  In this case, one plaintiff could not reserve a room in a Hilton Hotel because there 
were none available with necessary handicap access.
4
  A second plaintiff reserved and confirmed 
an accessible room, but no such room was available upon arrival.
5
  The third plaintiff discovered 
during his stay at another Hilton hotel that there were no roll-in showers.
6
  These three cases 
exemplify how facilities that do not comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 
harm disabled citizens.  To prevent these types of harm, Congress enacted the ADA along with 
enforcement mechanisms.
7
  
The primary enforcement mechanism involves placing liability on the shoulders of 
whomever is in charge of the underlying facility.  A significant problem arises when the 
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2
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 2 
language of the statute does not clearly delineate the liable party.  If a court determines that a 
franchisee with limited financial means is responsible, there is a possibility that the franchisee is 
judgment proof.
8
   If the responsible party is judgment proof, this will frustrate the enforcement 
mechanism of the ADA, because “[w]hen liability accrues only against judgment-proof entities, 
the effect is much the same is if there had been no liability at all.”9  Meanwhile, the franchisor 
corporation that possesses the means to satisfy the judgment, may avoid liability altogether.   
Thus, it is important to determine whether the franchisor or franchisee is the appropriate liable 
party for violations of the ADA.  
Section 303 of the ADA states that it is a violation to design and construct new facilities 
that do not provide proper access to the disabled.
10
  The statute states in plain language that it is 
an act of discrimination for places of public accommodations and commercial facilities built 
after 1990 not to comply with the accessibility requirements enumerated under section 302 of the 
ADA.
11
  A significant problem arises with the enforcement of this statute, because this section is 
unclear on which party a franchise relationship is to be liable when there is non-compliance.
12
 
While in many cases it is clear who exerts dominion over a facility and is therefore liable 
for an ADA violation, franchise facilities present a more complex question for liability.
13
  Often, 
businesses have hierarchies that lend themselves to easy identification of the owner and operator 
of the facilities, and thus there is no significant question of ADA liability. Likewise, no 
significant question arises when a franchisor is an owner or operator of a franchise, because their 
                                                             
8
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 3 
responsibilities under the ADA are clear.
14
  In both of these situations, Title III makes clear that 
the owner and operator must comply or risk facing penalties.
15
  The primary problem, over 
which there is a current circuit split amongst the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, occurs when the 
franchisor does not own or lease the property in question.  In such instances, it is unclear whether 
the franchisor or the owner-lessor is liable for section 303 violations of the ADA.
16
 The Eighth 
Circuit decision, United States v. Days Inns of America, Inc.
17
 established a “significant degree 
of control test” which allows for people other than owners, operators, lessees, and lessors to be 
found liable.
18
  The Ninth Circuit took a more restrictive approach in Lanberg v. Sanborn 
Theaters,
19
 which established a “parallel” test that limits liability only to owners, operators, 
lessors, and lessees.
20
     
This split presents a significant problem because there is a potential set of circumstances 
in which there is an appropriate and able party to bear liability but the facility remains 
inaccessible to disabled people due to the court finding a judgment-proof party liable.  Where 
neither the franchisee nor the franchisor owns the building because it is leased, and the lessor has 
contracted his liability to the lessee then there is no clearly identifiable owner for the purposes of 
this section of the ADA.  So the next step is to determine who would be the operator of the 
facility.  If ever there are circumstances that liability cannot be properly assigned to any party 
due to contractual relationships, then there is a significant threat to the purpose of the ADA and 
section 303 in particular.  The problem is also significant because in franchise relationships, the 
franchisor often maintains a significant degree of control and should therefore properly assume 
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 4 
liability for building in compliance with the ADA.  To allow the experienced trademark owner to 
guide the building of a new facility, and then not hold them liable for non-compliance with the 
ADA creates a significant problem in that it unjustly burdens the franchisee.  
This split identifies an important issue for franchises and those protected under the ADA 
because compliance with the ADA has significant value to the public, and the party ultimately 
responsible will bear additional costs in either obedience with the law or in fines and damages 
for failing to obey. While in most cases, there will be a party liable for compliance with the 
statute, and the plaintiff will be entitled to relief, the question of whether the franchisor or the 
franchisee should carry the burden of complying with the statute is one of equity and public 
policy.  Because of the ADA’s remedial purposes,21 it is important to clearly define the scope of 
applicability of its injunctive relief and damages provisions.  These provisions are the tools of 
enforcement; without a clearly-identifiable liable party, they are rendered less effective.   
The resolution of this dispute would clarify the law for both parties in the franchise 
relationship so that they may take appropriate action.  If the franchisor is on notice from the start 
that it will be liable for ADA compliance, then it may factor this into its business plan with such 
steps as raising the price of the trademark licensing fees to the franchisee.  The franchisee would 
also benefit from a bright line resolution of liability, because this would enable the franchisee to 
take steps to ensure compliance in the initial stages or even bargain for a reduced licensing fee 
since it would bare the additional costs. Regardless of where liability ultimately resides, the party 
bearing such a burden ought to be on notice so that the incentive of compliance is given full 
force.  Notice may also allow the responsible party to make more informed business decisions 
concerning trademark premiums and insurance policies. 
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This comment will explore the issue of whether the franchisor or the franchisee should be 
liable for compliance with the ADA in cases where the franchisor does not own or lease the 
realty for the underlying business operation.  The Comment will begin by discussing the key 
provisions of Title III of the ADA, concentrating primarily on section 303.  This overview will 
include interpretations of the language and legislative history concerning the Act.  Next, a brief 
discussion of franchise relationships will provide background for relevant agency concerns.  This 
Comment will then summarize and analyze the Eighth Circuit opinion in United States v. Days 
Inns of Am., and the Ninth Circuit decision in Longberg v. Sanborn Theaters.  This Comment 
will argue that the decision of the Eighth Circuit is the better one, but the holding of that court 
still leaves gaps, which the solution in this Comment aims to fill.  In the modified Eighth Circuit 
approach, franchisors would be liable when they possess significant control over the design and 
construction of franchise facilities, or when they have significant and pervasive control over the 
daily operations of the franchisee’s business plus actual notice of ADA violations.22  The 
franchisee should bare responsibility when the franchisor lacks requisite control of the design 
and build or when the franchisor has pervasive control but no actual notice of ADA violations. 
II. Background 
 The significant issue explored in this Comment is the extent of liability placed on 
franchisors that do not own or lease property within the context of section 303 of the ADA.  This 
background section will introduce the aspects of the ADA and franchised business relationships 
that are pertinent to this comment. First, this section will explain the underlying purpose of the  
ADA, before addressing the specific sections at issue, 302 and 303.  Then, this section will 
discuss franchise relationships in general and how liability affects this form of business.  
A. Overview of Americans with Disabilities Act  
                                                             
22
 See Days Inns, 151 F.3d at  825  
 6 
The enactment of the ADA is one of the greatest steps towards social equality in the 
United States’ history.  In section 2 of the ADA, Congress stated its findings and purpose for 
passing legislation that aims to create equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities.
23
  The 
ADA was intended to combat a long history of pervasive discrimination against people with 
disabilities and provide a legal recourse against such discrimination.
24
  Congress has further 
noted in section 2 of the ADA that the nation should provide equal opportunity to individuals 
with disabilities.
25
  The main purposes of the ADA are:  “(1) to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities; [and] (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent enforceable standards addressing 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”26  The ADA does not merely ensure equal 
treatment of individuals with disabilities; it creates a positive set of laws to empower the disabled 
when certain facilities discriminate against this disadvantaged group.
27
  The Act creates legally 
enforceable duties for public and private parties so that Americans with disabilities can 
participate meaningfully in society.
28
 
 Title III of the ADA regulates privately owned commercial facilities.
29
  It protects 
disabled patrons–actual or potential–from discrimination30 by mandating features to facilitate 
                                                             
2342 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (listing what Congress has identified as the historical discrimination against individuals 
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24
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25
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 Id.  
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 Robert L. Mullen, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Introduction for Lawyers and Judges, 29 LAND & 
WATER L. REV. 175, 180 (1994). 
28
 Id.  
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 Id. at 208 
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 Discrimination for the purposes of Title III of the ADA includes:  imposing criteria that screen out individuals 
with disabilities, the failure to make modifications to afford accommodation to those with disabilities, the failure to 
takes steps as necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or segregated, or the failure to 
remove architectural, communication, or transportation barriers in existing facilities.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1990). 
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accessibility.
31
  Title III mandates that places of public accommodation are designed and built, or 
altered, to allow for the access of individuals with disabilities.
32
   
 A commercial facility, as defined in the ADA, is a “facility intended for non-residential 
use.”33  The statute also defines a public accommodation as a private facility with operations that 
affect commerce.  The statute provides several examples, including hotels, restaurants, theaters, 
grocery stores, shopping centers, professional offices, and private schools.
34
 
While the Act enumerates specific public accommodations subject to regulation, the 
scope of Title III includes most commercial facilities.
35
  Section 302 addresses facilities first 
occupied prior to January 26, 1993; these are termed “existing facilities.”36 The language of 
section 302 relevant to this note includes:   
General rule: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of 
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation 
by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public 
accommodation.
37
   
 
This section then continues by stating that discrimination includes the failure to remove 
architectural barriers in existing facilities where such removal is readily achievable.
38
  The 
purpose of this section is to encourage activity that provides easier access by the physically 
disabled through the creation of a legally enforceable right, which does not acquiesce to the stale 
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pre-ADA norms of public discrimination.
39
  Section 303 then goes on to address newer 
construction, facilities that were built or altered after January 26, 1993.
40
   
The pertinent aspects of section 303 include the following language: “as applied to public 
accommodations and commercial facilities, discrimination for purposes of section 12182(a) 
includes–(a) a failure to design and construct facilities for first occupancy later than 30 months 
after July 26, 1990, that are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, 
except where an entity can demonstrate that it is structurally impracticable.”41  Note that the 
general rule in section 302 does not contain the phrase “commercial facility,” nor does it mention 
owners, operators or lessees.   This omission is the crux of the controversy surrounding the 
proper interpretation of section 303.  The language of the statute is passive, saying that a party is 
liable for failing to design and construct, but failing to clearly identify who is liable in that 
instance.  
 The last section of Title III of the ADA provides the means for enforcement.
42
  The 
primary means of enforcement is to provide injunctive relief, whereby accessibility for people 
with disabilities is properly facilitated.
43
  The Attorney General (and therefore also the DOJ), 
have power to investigate and bring actions for violations of the act.
44
  This statute does not 
provide for punitive damages, and money damages of $50,000 for a first violation and $100,000 
for a second are only awarded when the Attorney General brings the action.
45
  There is a private 
right of action, but the remedy for a private action is limited to injunctive relief.
46
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 Mullen, supra note 27, at 180. 
40
 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (2012). 
41
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42
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 B. Franchise Relationships 
 A franchise is a business relationship in which franchisees distribute goods and services, 
sometimes also producing them, on behalf of the franchisor.
47
  This symbiotic business structure 
allows for the franchisor to maintain multiple outlets of distribution without incurring expenses 
of operating the retail directly.  The franchisee derives a benefit from the ability to operate on a 
small scale with limited capital, while enjoying the advantages of the reputation of a well-
established business name.
48
  The key to this relationship is that the franchisor licenses the use of 
its trademark to the franchisee, and, in exchange, the franchisee must pay fees and accept certain 
duties and restrictions.
49
 
 The franchise relationship raises significant agency concerns, which potentially raise 
liability risks for the franchisor.  Prior to the 1950s, the liability of franchisors in connection with 
franchisee legal violations or wrongdoing was not a significant problem, because the business 
format of franchises was exceedingly rare other than for bottling plants.
50
  Now, franchises are so 
common that a new one opens “in the United States every eight minutes.”51  The law regarding 
franchisor liability, however, has not similarly grown at a rapid pace, and the law is still 
relatively unclear and unpredictable due to the fact-specific nature of the issue.
52
 The law 
regarding franchisor liability for statutory violations is especially unclear; however, the 
principles of vicarious tort liability for franchisors may elucidate the future direction of this area 
of law  
                                                             
47
 39 Am. Jur. 2d Franchisor’s Liability For Acts of Franchisee § 1 (1984). 
48
 Id.  
49
 Id. 
50
 Michael R. Flynn, The Law of Franchisor Vicarious Liability: A Critique, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 89, 90 
(1993). 
51
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52
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 There are a variety of theories under which a franchisor may be liable for the actions of a 
franchisee.
53
  A franchisor could face direct liability for “negligently design[ing] the layout or 
structure of the franchised unit.”54  Most tort claims against franchisors, however, are based in 
vicarious liability.
55
  Vicarious liability has three requirements:  (1) a legally sufficient 
relationship between the tortfeasor and the vicariously liable defendant; (2) the tortfeasor must 
have been acting tortuously; and (3) the tortfeasor’s conduct must have occurred within the scope 
of the legally sufficient relationship.
56
  
 The first element of vicarious liability, a legally sufficient relationship, can be met by 
showing that there is an employee-employer relationship, or actual agency, or apparent agency.
57
  
Due to the public’s perception that an individual franchised location may owned by the 
franchisor, apparent agency is an important concern for liability in franchise relationships.
58
  In 
fact, “[t]he apparent agency doctrine is the theory that poses the biggest threat of vicarious 
liability to franchisors.”59 
When looking for apparent or actual agency relationship, a court will examine the 
authority of one party to control the actions of the other.
60
  Often the authority need not actually 
be acted upon; rather, the ability to exercise control alone will suffice to find a legally sufficient 
relationship for the imposition of vicarious liability.
61
   In franchise relationships, the key 
element is the licensing and protection of the franchisor’s trademark.62  When the franchise 
agreement transcends this basic function as to essentially deprive the franchisee of any freedom 
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Id. at 425.  
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55
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56
Id. at 429. 
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58
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59
 Id. at 439. 
60
 Flynn, supra note 50, at 90. 
61
 Id., see also King, supra note, 51 at 430. 
62
 Flynn, supra note 50, at 90. 
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to make its own business decisions, then courts may find that an agency relationship is present.
63
  
A franchise agreement that contains language specifically denouncing the existence of an agency 
relationship will not immunize the franchisor from liability to third parties; however, the court 
will give weight to this language as one of the factors in its fact-sensitive inquiry.
64
  Another 
important factor may be the franchisor taking reasonable steps to assure that the franchised 
location prominently displays notice that the franchisee manages and operates a particular unit.
65
 
   
III. The Circuit Split 
 This issue of franchisor liability was at the core of two circuit court decisions, which 
addressed franchisor responsibility for ADA violations.  The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have a 
split on the interpretation of liability under section 303 of Title III of the ADA.  The central issue 
in each case was whether to extend liability to a party that is not an owner, operator, lessor, or 
lessee for the “design and build” of a facility that did not comply with the ADA.  The Eighth 
Circuit decision, United States v. Days Inns of America, Inc.
66
 established a “significant degree 
of control test,” which allows for people other than owners, operators, lessees, and lessors to be 
found liable.
67
  The Ninth Circuit took a more restrictive approach in Lanberg v. Sanborn 
Theaters,
68
 which established a “parallel” test that limits liability only to owners, operators, 
lessors, and lessees.
69
  There is also a relevant case from the Fifth Circuit, Neff v. Am. Dairy 
Queen Corp,
70
 which addresses franchisor liability under the ADA.  This case will briefly be 
                                                             
63
 Id. 
64
 39 Am. Jur. 2d Franchisor’s Liability For Acts of Franchisee § 3 (1984). 
65
 King, supra note 51 at 428. 
66
 Days Inns of Am., 151 F.3d at 825. 
67
 Id. at 825. 
68
 Lonberg, 259 F.3d at 1034. 
69
 Id. at 1034. 
70
 Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 1995). 
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discussed for the sake of completeness; however, the holding presents a narrow and unworkable 
standard that does not resolve the issue presented in this comment.   
 A. United States. v. Days Inns of America, Inc.  
 On behalf of the United States, the DOJ brought an action against the hotel franchisor 
Days Inns of America, Inc (“Days Inn”) alleging a violation of the ADA.71  The DOJ asserted 
that Days Inn failed to design and construct the Wall, South Dakota Days Inn Hotel within the 
accessibility requirements of the ADA.
72
  The district court held that Days Inn could not be held 
accountable under section 303 of the ADA because, “[it] did not design or construct Wall Days 
Inn and did not serve as the owner, lessor or operator of the hotel.”73  At issue on appeal before 
the Eighth Circuit was whether Days Inn designed and constructed the facility within the 
language of section 303 of the ADA.
74
 
 A Days Inn franchise representative referred Richard and Karla Hauck, the franchisees, to 
a specific architect and building contractor who both had previously participated in the design 
and build of other Days Inns.
75
  The Haucks entered into a detailed licensing agreement with 
Days Inn and then failed to comply with its terms.
76
  Instead of filing detailed architectural plans 
with Days Inn as required, the Haucks sent only four pages of preliminary plans.
77
  After the 
architect finalized the plans, he did not have them approved by the Days Inn design and construct 
department, nor did the Haucks or the architect send the amended plans to Days Inn at any point 
during the construction of the hotel.
78
 Days Inn had a detailed planning and design manual that 
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 Days Inns, 151 F.3d at 823. 
72
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73
 Id. at 824. 
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included a specific section requiring the franchisee to comply with the ADA.  This hotel was 
built in 1992 and therefore qualifies as newly constructed facility within the scope of 303.
79
 
 In its argument to the Eighth Circuit, Days Inn proposed interpreting section 303 in 
conjunction with a reading of section 302.
80
  Thus, it asserted that, “any person who owns, leases 
(or leases to), or operates [a noncompliant facility],” is liable under section 302 and therefore 
should also be the only parties able to bear liability under section 303.
81
 Days Inn argued that 
with this interpretation the court must find it not liable, because it is a franchisor that did not 
own, lease, or operate the underlying property in violation of the ADA.
82
  The court rejected this 
argument, because Days Inn’s reading would limit the applicability of this section only to places 
of public accommodation and therefore not include other newly constructed commercial 
facilities.
83
  The court reasoned that the effect of this proposed interpretation would create a gap, 
which leaves no party liable, “for violations of new construction accessibility standards for 
buildings which are commercial facilities only.”84  The court noted that this clearly defies the 
intent of Congress in drafting the statute, and they resolved the dispute by asserting a plain 
language interpretation of the section.
85
 
 The court first noted that statutes must be interpreted so as to give meaning to each term, 
and that Congress did not intend to create gaps in the ADA.
86
  The court reasoned that Days 
Inn’s interpretation would create a gap and therefore is an incorrect interpretation.87  The court 
                                                             
79
 See 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (1990);  Days Inns,151 F.3d at 824. 
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further noted that this resolution would not give effect to the plain language in the ADA.
88
  Thus, 
the court concluded that section 303 does not apply only to owners, operators, lessors, or lessees 
of a facility.
89
 
 The court next turned to interpreting the meaning of “design and construct” within 
section 303.
90
  The court utilized the DOJ’s Technical Assistance Manual for clarification on 
which parties may be liable for failure to design and construct in accordance with the ADA.
91
  
The court resolved this issue by giving deference to legitimate interpretation of the agency 
empowered to enforce the statute, in this case the DOJ.
92
  The court concluded, “that to bear 
responsibility for an inaccessible facility under section 303, a party must possess a significant 
degree of control over the final design and construction of a facility.”93 
 The court applied its reasoning to the facts at hand, and decided that Days Inn had 
extensive and pervasive authority to control the design and build process.
94
  This was evident in 
the language of the franchise agreement.
95
 Days Inn did not exercise this authority, and they did 
not have notice of the facility’s lack of compliance.96  Thus the court opined that the franchisor 
in this case could not be liable.
97
  Rather in order to find liability, a franchisor must either 
exercise its control over the design and build process, or have the authority to exercise this 
control plus actual knowledge of the facility’s lack of ADA compliance.98  The case was 
remanded to find the extent of knowledge possessed by Days Inn.
99
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89
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B. Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters 
 In Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, the complaint was not brought against a franchisor; the 
core issue in the case, however, is directly relevant to this comment. The primary issue of 
Lonberg is whether a party who is not an owner, operator, lessor or lessee can be held liable for 
noncompliance with the ADA.
100
  Here individuals bound to wheelchairs brought a private action 
against the architect of a theater that did not provide accessibility in accordance with the ADA.
101
 
 The facility in this dispute was a movie theater, which was operated by Mr. Sanborn, 
owned by West Coast Realty, and designed by an architectural firm.
102
  All three of these parties 
were defendants in the case; however, the architect, Salts, Troutman & Kaneshiro, Inc. (“STK”), 
was the sole defendant in this appeal of partial summary judgment.
103
  The plaintiffs, Lonberg 
and Goldkorn, were disabled, in wheelchairs, and required special access to public facilities.
104
  
The plaintiffs alleged six separate ADA violations in the design and construction of the movie 
theater.  The court narrowly framed the issue as, “whether [Salts, Troutman & Kaneshiro, Inc.] 
can be liable for ‘design and construct’ discrimination even though it is not one of the entities–
owners, leassees, lessors, or operators—to whom liability is extended by the ‘[g]eneral rule’ 
under § 12182(a).”105  
 The plaintiffs argued that the limitation of liability under the general rule of section 302 
should not also limit the parties liable for “design and construct” discrimination under 303.106  
The plaintiffs asserted a theory that is akin to the “significant degree of control test” from United 
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 Lonberg at 1030. 
101
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103
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104
 Id.  
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 Id. at 1033. 
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 Lonberg at 1033. 
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States v. Days Inns of America, Inc.
107
  The defendants argued that Congress used the phrase 
“public accommodation” in the general provision, but then Congress drafted section 303 with the 
language, “as applied to public accommodations and commercial facilities, discrimination . . . 
includes . . . a failure to design and construct compliant buildings.”108  The phrase “commercial 
facilities” is defined within Title III of the ADA as having a scope that exceeds public 
accommodations.
109
 The plaintiffs argued that section 302 already applies liability to owners, 
operators, lessees, and lessors of public accommodation, and Congress must have intended 
section 303 to extend liability to parties who design and control commercial facilities; otherwise 
the language would create a gap and have no substantial effect.
110
  The court noted that this 
argument implicitly suggested that the architect had the most control over the design and build of 
the facility.
111
   
 The court determined that the plaintiff’s reading of the ADA is overly expansive and 
“create[s] a category of liability found nowhere in the text or legislative history of the ADA.”112  
STK argued that the court should adopt a “parallel” interpretation of the language in section 303, 
meaning that the liable parties under section 303 should mirror those potentially liable entities 
enumerated in section 302.
113
  The court opined that, although lacking much evidentiary support, 
this “parallel” interpretation is more consistent with the text of the ADA.114  The court explained:  
“[section 303] reads: as applied to public accommodations and commercial facilities, 
discrimination for the purposes of [section 302] of this title includes . . . .”115  Without much 
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 Id.; See discussion supra Part III B. 
108
 42 U.S.C. § 12182, 12183 (1990); Lonberg, at 1034 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
109
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explanation, the court concluded that Congress likely intended to limit liability only to the listed 
parties in section 302, because section 303 does not make a separate list of potentially liable 
parties.
116
  The court ultimately rejected the “significant degree of control” approach because it 
“created a category of liability found nowhere in the text or legislative history of the ADA.”117  
 The court additionally preferred the “parallel” approach to the “significant degree of 
control” approach because it is more consistent with other titles of the ADA.118  The court 
explained that each title of the ADA initially describes a general rule of liability, and then each 
following subsection just describes what amounts to discrimination.
119
  Finally, the court noted 
that the main remedy in Title III claims is injunctive relief, and only a person who is in current 
control of the building has authority to provide this remedy.
120
  Therefore, the placement of 
liability on an architect, builder, or subcontractor who lacks ability to provide the statutory relief 
is a misinterpretation that gives no effect to the purpose of the section.
121
  The court accordingly 
held that only an owner, operator, lessor, or lessee can be liable for violations of Title III of the 
ADA.
122
 
 C. Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp 
 A Disabled customer brought an action against the restaurant franchisor in Neff v. Am. 
Dairy Queen.
123
  In this case, Margo Neff required the use of wheelchair, and she alleged that the 
Nacogdoches Dairy Queen retail store posed several accessibility barriers to the disabled.
124
  
American Dairy Queen Corporation (“ADQ”) owns the trademark “Dairy Queen”, and they 
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licensed this trademark to the underlying Nacogdoches location.
125
  Neff argued that the 
inaccessibility to the restaurant was a violation of section 302 of the ADA, and furthermore that 
ADQ as the franchisor ought to be liable.
126
  The district court granted ADQ summary judgment, 
based on a ruling that they did not “operate” the store within the meaning of section 302.127  
 Upon appeal, the Fifth Circuit defined the issue of the case as, “whether a franchisor with 
limited control over a franchisee’s store ‘operates a place of public accommodation’ within the 
meaning of section 302(a).”128  The court concluded that ADQ had pervasive control of the 
Nacogdoches location that extended to accounting, uniforms, and the use of the trademark.
129
  
Despite this control, the court ultimately found that these factors were irrelevant to the question 
of whether ADQ “operates” the facility for purposes of the ADA.130  The Fifth Circuit opined 
that the determination of the franchisor’s liability ought to rest solely on the terms of the 
franchise agreement, and the franchise agreement in that case only provided for a veto power on 
structural changes.
131
  The court further determined that this veto power did not amount to ADQ 
operating the facility, because ADQ could only have utilized this power prior to the building of 
the existing facility.
132
  The ADA has no retroactive effect and was not in effect at the time this 
facility was built, so the court concludes that ADQ cannot be liable.
133
  
 This case is not discussed throughout the note because the Fifth Circuit concentrates the 
term “operates” under section 302, which only concerns pre-existing facilities.  The Eighth and 
Ninth Circuit cases focus on section 303, which is just new construction.  The Fifth Circuit’s 
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holding also is narrower than the Ninth Circuit’s, and therefore any criticisms about to the 
“parallel” approach will also identify flaws in the Fifth Circuit approach.  The case was 
nonetheless mentioned, because it was the first case to address the issue of whether franchisors 
should be liable for franchise facilities failing to comply with the ADA. 
 
IV.  Analysis 
 The Eighth Circuit approach provides the better interpretation of section 303 of the ADA, 
because it reflects legislative intent and gives greater force to the overall intent of the ADA.  The 
“significant degree of control” interpretation is consistent with congressional intent, promotes 
public policy considerations, and is economically efficient.  The holding of the Ninth Circuit too 
broadly rejected the parties that may be held liable under section 303.  Although the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Lonberg–which denied liability to the architect–may have been correct, the 
holding of that case also denies the potential for liability of any franchisor regardless of how 
instrumental a player they are in the design and build of the facility.  Thus the Eighth Circuit 
approach provides the superior interpretation.  First the Eighth Circuit approach gives the most 
effect to congressional intent by means of the DOJ’s interpretation of the statute.  Second, the 
expansive liability created by the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of section 303 is more cost 
effective than the interpretation given by the Ninth Circuit.   
As a result, the most useful interpretation of section 303 is one that reflects the Eighth 
Circuit’s interpretation, but focuses less on the notice requirement when there is a strong degree 
of control.  This solution, the modified Eighth Circuit approach, would embrace the holding of 
the Eighth Circuit, but widen the coverage of liability for franchisors.  Finally, a brief discussion 
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on general agency and franchisor liability under section 303 will serve to complete the picture of 
the appropriate level of franchisor liability with respect to ADA compliance.  
 
A. Statutory Interpretation 
  This circuit split here arises out of the Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s divergent 
interpretations of section 303.  The first step of assessing the scope of a statute is to look to the 
plain language and give each word its ordinary meaning, unless it is defined otherwise.
134
  The 
United States Supreme Court established a principle of statutory interpretation that a court 
should, “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of the statute.”135  This presumes that 
Congress does not draft a statute without intent to give significance to every word. One must 
remember that all meaning is contextual.
136
  Thus, while the meaning of each individual word 
may be clear, an ambiguity may arise from syntax—the interrelationship of the “living 
words.”137  A reader perceives a meaning of each word informing the others and “all in their 
aggregate tak[ing] their purport from the setting in which they are used.”138  Therefore, the 
overall meaning of a statute–however artfully written–may nonetheless be ambiguous in its 
application, as perfectly exemplified by the current circuit split. 
Ambiguity, however, is not the only guidepost of statutory interpretation and is not a 
prerequisite to utilizing extrinsic interpretive aids.
139
  Under some circumstances, a court will 
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look beyond the language of the statute.
140
  If a literal reading of a statute “produces an outcome 
that is demonstrably at odds with clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, or results 
in an outcome that can truly be characterized as absurd, i.e., that is so gross as to shock the 
general moral or common sense, then we can look beyond an unambiguous statute and consult 
legislative history to divine its meaning.”141  
Furthermore, if a governmental agency is charged with enforcing and interpreting the 
statute, the Supreme Court has held that the agency ultimately has authority to reasonably fill in 
gaps in the applicability of the statute.
 142
  “If a statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing 
agency's construction is reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency's 
construction of the statute, even if the agency's reading differs from what the court believes is the 
best statutory interpretation.”143  In Chevron, the court reasoned that the agencies charged with 
enforcement of a specific statute are better equipped than the courts to discern policy questions 
regarding the interpretation of that statute.
144
  The DOJ has enforcement authority for Title III of 
the ADA.
145
  The Eighth Circuit gives deference to the DOJ’s interpretation, while the Ninth 
Circuit relies solely on the courts own policy for statutory interpretation.
146
  
 
 B. Public Policy 
The modified Eighth Circuit approach is bolstered by important public policy 
considerations. According to the results of the 2000 Census, there were close to fifty million 
people with severe disabilities living in the United States. This number represents approximately 
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twenty percent of the total population.
147
  A significant number of disabled Americans find it 
difficult to gain access to a number of services and activities that should otherwise be available 
to them due to discrimination or ignorance on the part of others.
148
  Historically, society has 
tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities and even today, the discrimination 
against such individuals persists in areas of housing, employment, public accommodation, and 
transportation, to name a few.
149
  In passing the ADA, Congress was motivated by worthy 
principles. Among them was the idea that physical or mental disability should in no way 
diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society.150  In addition, unlike 
individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national origin or age, 
Americans with disabilities did not–prior to the passage of the ADA–have any access to a 
meaningful recourse to redress such discrimination.
151
  The nation’s goal regarding people with 
disabilities is to assure equality of opportunity and full participation in our society.
152
  Congress 
believed that this laudable objective would best be obtained by providing a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities.
153
  As a part of this objective, Congress allowed for a private right of action in cases 
of ADA discrimination. Recognizing the need to expand liability to parties who take an active 
role in designing and constructing facilities, the DOJ sought to impose liability not only on the 
owners of the premises but also on construction companies and architects.
154
 In spite of that 
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effort, the ADA remains under-enforced.
155
  The DOJ has the authority to certify that state and 
local accessibility requirements, frequently established through the building codes, meet or 
exceed the ADA’s accessibility requirements. If a particular state has acquired such certification 
and an entity has complied with it, this would serve as rebuttable evidence of compliance with 
the ADA. In 2005 only five states took advantage of this program.
156
 One conclusion to be drawn 
from these facts is that states are hesitant in policing compliance with the ADA.
157
  The modified 
Eighth Circuit approach would allow for an additional avenue for recovery, thus encouraging 
plaintiffs and their attorneys to bring ADA cases. 
On the other hand, interpreting the term “operates” narrowly will adversely affect the 
ability of plaintiffs and government to successfully enforce compliance with the Act.
158
 The 
categories of facilities of “public accommodations” subject to the ADA are frequently operated 
through franchise agreements, e.g. hotels, fast food chains, movie theaters.
159
 Inability to reach 
franchisors that have the power to dictate how the stores are built and how they operate 
substantially frustrates the Congressional aim to end discrimination against Americans with 
disabilities in day-to-day life.  
The modified Eighth Circuit approach is a fair test that will allow for furtherance of this 
important public policy by expanding liability to all those individuals who actively participate in 
both construction of the facilities and the day-to-day operation of the business. Holding 
franchisors liable would allow for greater recourse for individuals with disabilities and would 
help ensure compliance. This test is fair because it limits liability of compliance to parties with a 
financial stake in the business that is conducted at the noncompliant facility.  
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 C. Incorporating Tort-Like Principles with Franchisor Liability Under the ADA. 
            A similar debate has developed in cases of franchisor’s liability for franchisee’s tortious 
conduct.
160
 A parallel between tortious conduct and statutory compliance is a useful one. 
Franchisors may be held vicariously liable for the torts of their for the acts of its franchisee if the 
“tortious acts were performed within the franchise relationship and the franchisor had a right to 
control the acts of the franchise, or if the injured party reasonably believed that the franchisor 
exercised control over the franchisee and detrimentally relied on that belief.”161  Thus, a tort 
victim may have two avenues to pursue: 1) the theory of respondeat superior and 2) the theory of 
apparent authority.
162
  To encourage ADA compliance, a similar legal theory should be adopted 
in determining who should be held to account under section 302 of the statute. When one intends 
to stay at a Days Inn and the nationally run, franchisor-operated website provides that the facility 
would accommodate one with disabilities, then equity should provide compensation to a plaintiff 
who detrimentally relied on such representation. Thus, the theory of apparent authority should be 
applied in cases of ADA compliance, as it is applied in cases of tort victims. 
            In instances of passive trademarking, however, the law becomes murkier. Passive 
trademarking occurs when the franchisor licenses the trademark to the franchisee, but does not 
facilitate uniform standards of practice, supervise customer engagements, or play a role in day-
to-day management.
163
  In cases of passive trademarks, the trademark owners can shield 
themselves from tort liability caused to their consumers by franchisors.
164
  For example, in Mobil 
Oil v. Bransford, Mobil was able to avoid liability to consumer who was severely beaten by a 
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Mobil Mart employee.
165
  Thus, passive trademarking allows for the operation of the business 
that offers many benefits with few drawbacks.
166
  The trademark holder, or the franchisor, is able 
to reap all the benefits of public recognition and the goodwill of the brand while carrying no 
responsibility in ensuring the safety and quality of their products or compliance with the ADA.
167
 
The primary drawback to this is that, “[m]ost customers assume they are dealing with the 
trademark owner, and even those who realize they are not lack information necessary to contract 
meaningfully with the entities that operate behind the trademark’s mask.”168  This approach is 
severely flawed, and it has been proposed that holders of the trademark, even if passive, be 
jointly and severally liable for damages sustained by tort victims.
169
  The arguments presented 
for this proposition also support the imposition of liability in cases of non-compliance with the 
ADA. 
            First, trademark and license holders as opposed to the customer should monitor 
trademark users.
170
  Business “display trademark in order to reassure their customers.”171  Thus, 
when purchasing a trademark, a lay consumer will reasonably expect that the business will stand 
behind their product. Instead, the law presumes that “customer has contracted for the liability of 
whatever entity is doing business under the trademark.”172  This is simply a legal fiction that 
cannot be reconciled with reality.
173
  This legal presumption is irreconcilable with most 
commercial legal theories that aim to honor reasonable expectations of the parties in a bargaining 
process.
174
  Similarly, reasonable expectations of being able to obtain service in the areas of 
public accommodations for the individuals covered by the ADA should be fulfilled.    
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D. Eight Circuit Approach Promotes Economic Efficiency. 
Requiring the franchisors to bear the cost of ADA compliance will allow for greater 
economic efficiency through cost shifting. Most licensing agreements already require “financial 
responsibility and indemnification from their licensees”175 in cases of tortious conduct. Placing 
the burden of ADA compliance on the franchisors will as well allow the franchisors and the 
franchisees to contractually allocate the cost of such compliance amongst each other. The 
prospect of potential liability will ensure that the franchisor takes the most cost effective 
measures of compliance, such as close inspections of the building sites prior to the completion of 
the construction. 
            Furthermore, anticipating potential liability for noncompliance, the franchisor will be 
able to pass the cost of compliance to its franchisees through the increased franchisee fees, and 
ultimately, to the end consumer through the increased prices; thereby, requiring the society as a 
whole to carry the burden of the compliance with the ADA, which is in accord with the 
Congressional intent.
176
 
 
 E. Proposed Solution: The Modified Eighth Circuit Approach 
 As discussed above, the Eighth circuit approach is superior to the holding from the 9
th
 
circuit; however, the holding in the in the Eighth could still be improved.  In United States v. 
Days Inns of America, Inc., the defendant franchisor was found not to be liable unless the 
plaintiff could show that DIA had actual knowledge of the lack of ADA compliance in the 
facility.  The court claimed essentially that a franchisor with authority to control the design and 
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build of a facility could still escape liability.  The franchisor could simply choose not to exercise 
its authority to control during the design and build phase, and then subsequently not make itself 
aware of the lack of compliance in the franchisee’s facility.  This result presents a risk of 
encouraging bad-faith players to intentionally act just as DIA did; a franchisor could maintain 
significant control over the franchisee in its day-to-day business and suggest ADA compliance in 
manuals, but then never actually assure compliance by exerting that authority or obtaining notice 
of the final state of the facility. 
 The modified Eighth Circuit approach does not allow for what amounts to a loophole for 
the franchisors.  It presents a clear rule that if franchisors possess the authority to control the 
design and build of a facility, then they will be liable under section 303 for the resulting building 
albeit owned and operated by the franchisee.  Although this expands the scope of liability under 
the Eighth Circuit’s holding, it only does this with respect to franchisors and not with parties 
such as architects or contractors.   
 To complete the scope of franchisor liability under section 303, this section will discuss 
when the authority to control design and build of a facility should be imputed upon a franchisor.  
Applying general agency standards, if the franchisor is determined to have a pervasive control 
over the day-to-day activities of the franchisee, then courts may find an existence of a principal-
agent relationship.  Under this relationship the acts of the franchisee within the scope of the 
franchise relationship will be for the benefit of the franchisor, and the two parties will not be 
acting as autonomous business entities.  Therefore the franchisor that does not specifically claim 
authority over the design and build of the franchisee’s facility, may still maintain this authority 
since it has a general control over the business actions of the franchisee.  This agency 
relationship has the effect of burdening the franchisor with liability under section 303, because it 
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imputes the authority to control the design and build of the facility, which is all that is really 
necessary under the modified Eighth Circuit approach.  It is important to note, however, that in 
franchise agreement retaining control over the construction and ensuring common design of 
buildings is of great importance.
177
  Thus, the Eight Circuit decision will present a franchisor 
with an ultimatum: 1). he can relinquish all control over the design and built, or 2). he will have 
to serve as an insurer of ADA compliance.
178
  Typically the franchisor’s first option would result 
in an inability to promote their brand, and therefore it is likely that they will choose to avoid 
being subjected to ADA violations and the penalties associated therewith. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Upon first glance, having two parties potentially liable for ADA violations may seem like 
a benefit that makes compliance twice as likely.  Currently there is a problem with the lack Title 
III ADA compliance, however, and having two parties who both think the other is liable serves 
to exacerbate this problem. The Congressional intent of the ADA is not primarily to force the 
DOJ into the realm of business operation; rather, the ADA serves to protect disabled Americans.  
The intent of the ADA in section 303 is to reduce and eliminate physical barriers, and the 
franchise business structure ought not detract from the force of the ADA by making compliance 
less likely.  Franchisors create their business structure as to avoid certain types of daily 
operational responsibilities and liabilities.  Contracting for the avoidance of specific torts does 
not offend public policy where there is still a responsible party.  Liability for noncompliance 
with ADA construction specifications is a different type of issue.  The Eighth Circuit’s 
interpretation offers a solution that does not necessitate increased cost to the franchisor; instead it 
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promotes a motivating factor for the franchisor to create a system that ensures ADA compliance.  
The costs of construction for compliance can always be passed to the franchisee on the front end, 
but the courts are just making sure that the costs of liability cannot also be passed to the 
franchisee.  When the courts can give fill a gap of statutory interpretation, choosing the option 
that more effectively produces the intent of the overall statute seems to be the better choice.  
Here, we have two Circuit Courts providing reasonable interpretations, but the Eighth Circuit 
approach should facilitate a franchisor to be more responsible in regards to the ADA.  Since the 
franchisor is typically involved many facilities nationwide, it is not unreasonable for the courts to 
interpret that they ought to include sound ADA knowledge within their own breadth of expertise.  
As of now the fines that could be imposed by the DOJ are not too onerous, and the franchisor 
maintains the ability to force the franchisee to pay for the construction that is required for 
compliance.  The result of the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation should really only serve to create a 
bright line rule that encourages franchisors to monitor the construction of the franchisee’s 
facilities.  As an additional benefit, when the underlying facility is fully ADA compliant, the 
franchisor will avoid damage to the goodwill of their trademark.   
